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Chelsea Jasnoff 
Injecting Trade Secret Principles into Pennsylvania’s Fracking Law, Extracting its First 
Amendment Deficiencies  
Laws that allow companies to withhold from the public information about their products 
or processes by claiming such information as “trade secrets”1 present a troublesome dilemma for 
government: should the law protect the economic interests of companies who contribute useful 
innovation and stimulation to society while sacrificing citizens’ access to information?2  
Traditionally, the potential impact of this dilemma was mitigated or even avoided by certain 
limiting doctrines inherent in the ordinary law of trade secrecy
3
.  For example, ordinary trade 
secret protection is not absolute—it is balanced against competing public policies such as public 
health.
4
  Further, both common law trade secrecy and modern state legislation modeled after the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act
5
 does not protect information that is in fact widely known to 
                                                        
1 The common law definition of a trade secret is “any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of 
information which is used in one’s business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.” RESTATEMENT  (FIRST) OF TORTS §757 
cmt. b at 5 (1939). 
2 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash Between 
Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 61 (“Providing legal protection for trade secrets acts as an 
incentive for investment in innovation.”).  But see Travis D. Van Ort, Hydraulic Fracturing 
Additives: A Solution to the Tension Between Trade Secret Protection and Demands for Public 
Disclosure, 4 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 439, 451 (2012)  (“A balance must 
be struck between the public demand to be informed and protected and the need to allow drilling 
companies to exploit important and large domestic energy supplies.”). 
3
 Throughout this Note, the phrase “ordinary trade secret law” will be used to refer to common 
law and statutory trade secret protection, as distinguished from laws that contain incidental trade 
secret provisions as a part of their regulatory scheme.  
4
 See Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First 
Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 780, 787 (2007) (“most trade secret injunctions aim to 
regulate illegal or unethical conduct”). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
40 cmt c (1995); See Lyndon, supra note 2, at 458.  
5
 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act is discussed in more detail in section C below. 
 2 
competitors or obtained through a “lawful” means, such as reverse engineering.6  Despite its 
prudent doctrines and strong common law foundations, the ordinary law of trade secrecy is no 
longer the exclusive means through which entities and individuals protect their trade secrets.  
Federal and state laws that mandate disclosure by potentially dangerous industries accommodate 
the economic imperatives of such industries and provide some protection for information with 
competitive value, including trade secrets.  However, unlike ordinary trade secret law, such laws 
do not protect trade secrets through a “cause of action for misappropriation” initiated ex post.7  
Instead, these regulatory laws eliminate the need for such a cause of action because they simply 
exempt trade secrets from disclosure requirements or impose confidentiality requirements on 
agencies receiving the information.
8
  While the purported intent of disclosure laws is to protect 
and improve the environment and public health
9
, this goal is nevertheless offset by the existence 
of exemptions and loopholes.
10
  One such exemption excuses companies from a law’s 
                                                        
6
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION; see also Lyndon, supra note 2, at 458. 
7
 Lyndon, supra note 2 at 458. 
8
 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2613 (providing that a company may 
designate reported information as a trade secret in order to prevent the EPA from disclosing it).  
It is believed that “[i]n the past several years, 95 percent of the notices for new chemicals sent 
to the government requested some secrecy” under the TSCA.  Lyndsey Layton, Use of 
Potentially Harmful Chemicals Kept Secret Under Law, WASHINGTON POST 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/03/AR2010010302110.html 
(Jan. 4, 2010). 
9
 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (stating that “adequate authority should exist to regulate 
chemical substances and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment”). 
10 See, e.g., Todd Wynn, ALEC Encourages Responsible Resource Production, AM. LEGIS.  
(March 1, 2012), http://www.americanlegislator.org/2012/03/alec-encourages-responsible-
resource-production; see also Cora Currier, ALEC and ExxonMobil Push Loopholes in Fracking 
Chemical Disclosure Rules, PROPUBLICA (April 24, 2012, 1:06pm), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/alec-and-exxonmobil-push-loopholes-in-fracking-chemical-
disclosure-rules 
 3 
“mandatory” chemical disclosure requirements if the company claims the required information 
contains trade secrets.
11
  
It is through these trade-secret exemptions that participants in the hydraulic fracturing 
(hereinafter “fracking”) industry avoid disclosing information about the chemicals used in their 
operations, despite the hazards the chemicals pose to the environment and public health.
12
  
Because of a loophole in a federal law that would otherwise sweep fracking into its jurisdiction, 
discussed further in Part I, Section B, supra, it is up to state legislatures to decide how fracking 
should be regulated.  Pennsylvania is among states that have that have responded to heavy 
fracking activity by proposing and enacting regulations regarding chemical disclosure. 
                                                        
11 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2613 (providing that information that 
trade secrets may not be disclosed by any agency except in a few narrowly defined 
circumstances); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act § 7 U.S.C. §136(h)(b) 
(providing that “the Administrator shall not make public information which in the 
Administrator's judgment contains or relates to trade secrets or commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”). See also Lyndsey Layton, 
Use of Potentially Harmful Chemicals Kept Secret Under Law, WASHINGTON POST 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/03/AR2010010302110.html 
(Jan. 4, 2010) (“Scientists and environmental groups say manufacturers have exploited 
weaknesses in the law to claim secrecy for an ever-increasing number of chemicals”). Layton 
explains that under the Toxic Substances Control Act, companies are required to notify the 
government when their chemicals pose a “substantial risk,” but most of the chemicals that firms 
say pose a substantial risk are those that are claimed to be secret. Id. 
12
 Compare Theo Colborn, Carol Kwiatkowski, Kim Shultz & Mary Bachran, Natural Gas 
Operations from a Public Health Perspective, 17:5 HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: 
AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 1039, (2011) available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10807039.2011.605662 (explaining the negative health effects 
associated with fracking processes) with Jim Moscou, THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 19, 2008, 8:00 
PM) http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/08/19/a-toxic-spew.html (quoting 
Halliburton executive Ron Heyden saying that asking a company to disclose the chemical 
composition of its products is like “asking Coca-Cola to disclose the formula of Coke”) and 
Mike Soraghan, Hydraulic Fracturing: Two-third of Frack Disclosures Omit ‘Secrets’, 
ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY PUBLISHING (Sept. 26, 2012). 
http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/09/26/1 (“[f]or years, oil and gas companies 
opposed the disclosure of the contents of their fracking fluid by saying that giving away their 
proprietary recipes would put them at a competitive disadvantage”) 
 4 
Part I of this Note will provide a background on the process of fracking and will describe 
the regulatory framework governing fracking operations. Part II will explore the merits of a 
recent Free Speech challenge brought against the medical gag rule by first examining the 
threshold issue of whether the medical gag rule interferes with the type of speech or expression 
that triggers First Amendment protection.  Upon concluding, based on principles of First 
Amendment law, that the medical gag rule imposes a content-based restriction on speech, Part II 
will accordingly analyze the medical gag rule using a strict scrutiny standard to determine 
whether the provision is constitutional.  Part III will examine whether fracking companies might 
nevertheless have a legitimate property right in their trade secrets that justifies limiting the rights 
of sick patients and doctors seeking information about chemical exposure.  Part IV proposes 
changes to the medical gag rule that might repair its constitutional defects.   
PART I 
A. FRACKING: WHAT IS IT, AND WHY ARE WE CONCERNED? 
In recent years, natural gas production from shale formations
13
 has grown rapidly and 
currently supplies about 22% of the nation’s total energy.14  There are several shale gas reserves 
throughout the United States, the largest one being the Marcellus Shale Play. The Marcellus 
Shale spans over 95,000 miles of the eastern United States and underlies Pennsylvania, among 
several other states.
15
  Prior to the introduction of the fracking method, natural gas remained 
                                                        
13
 Shale is a sedimentary rock that contains natural gas deposits. See GROUND 
WATERCPROTECTION COUNCIL & ALL CONSULTING, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 30 (2009) [hereinafter, “SHALE GAS PRIMER”]. Natural gas derived 
from shale formations and other unconventional sources is expected to replace natural gas from 
other “conventional sources” such as sands and carbonate formations.  Joseph A. Dammel, Notes 
from the Underground, 12:2 MINN. J.L.SCI. & TECH. 773, 776. 
14
 SHALE GAS PRIMER, supra note 15, at 25. 
15
 Id. at 100. 
 5 
trapped in these rock formations because they could not be extracted economically.
16
  Today, an 
estimated 90% of natural gas wells in the United States use fracking to extract the gas deposits 
from shale.
17
  The modern and controversial method of fracking is known as horizontal 
slickwater fracturing, which frees the natural gas trapped in shale formations by injecting high-
pressure “fracturing fluid” underground into the shale formations in order to crack the shale and 
allow the gas to escape into wells collecting the gas.
18
  The fracturing fluid used to create the 
fractures and keep them open is composed primarily of water, but contains a small amount of 
chemical additives and sand to ease the flow into the wells.
19
  
Proponents of hydraulic fracturing applaud it for being an efficient method of natural gas 
production, freeing the nation from dependence on foreign energy sources, and providing 
economic benefits to struggling towns located near drilling operations.
 20
   Opponents, on the 
other hand, argue that fracking is dangerous because the chemicals are injected deep 
underground and therefore might contaminate water supply, causing grave health problems for 
citizens.
 21
   
                                                        
16 See Justin Kuepper, The Definitive Guide to Fracking, COMMODITY HQ (Nov 11, 2012) 
http://commodityhq.com/2012/the-definitive-guide-to-fracking/ 
17 Dammel, supra note 15, at 778. 
18
 Id. at 778. 
19
 Id. at 779  
20
 See Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent In a 
Fracturing Energy Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV 1, 3-4 (2011) (“This extraction technique will 
bolster America’s energy independence for this period”); see also Frack Freely but Disclose 
Chemicals Put Into the Ground, BLOOMBERG (April 11, 2012 7:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-11/frack-freely-but-disclose-chemicals-put-into-the-
ground.html (“fracking holds great promise: It enables the extraction of natural gas, which is 
abundant, cleaner to produce and burn than other fossil fuels, and cheap.”) 
21
 Mike Ludwig, Former Oil Executive, Doctors, and Scientists Urge Obama to Wait on 
Fracking Exports Plan, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 19, 2012), http://truth-out.org/news/item/13413-former-
oil-executive-doctors-and-scientists-urge-obama-to-halt-fracking-exports (explaining that a 
former high-ranking Mobile Oil executive spoke out against expanding domestic fracking 
operations, voicing concerns about its effect on the water supply.) 
 6 
Whatever the merits of fracking, several incidents have vindicated critics’ concerns that 
chemicals are contaminating water supply and air.  In June 2006, for example, a chemical plant 
in New Mexico spilled a large amount of fracking fluid, which created a large cloud of acid 
vapors.
22
  People living near the plant soon began experiencing nausea and vomiting and about 
220 people had to be evacuated from their homes.
23
  In 2009 and 2010, oil and gas wastewater 
leaked into public drinking water in Wyoming, and high levels of 2‐butoxyethanol, a chemical 
associated with liver and kidney damage, were subsequently detected in the water.
24
   
In response to such incidents indicating the hazards of fracking, a few organizations 
conducted studies on the health effects of the chemicals used for fracking. For example, the 
Endocrine Disruption Exchange (“TEDX”) conducted a study on the health effects of natural gas 
operations by gathering information largely through Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS)
25
 and 
accident and spill reports.
26
 TEDX ultimately concluded that 43% of the chemicals known to be 
present in the fracking fluids it studied have potential hazardous effects on the human endocrine 
system, and other chemicals can potentially cause cancer, organ damage, and respiratory and 
                                                        
22 Halliburton Spill Results in Acid Cloud, More than 220 People Evacuated to Mall, 
YOURLAWYER.COM (June 7, 2006),www.yourlawyer.com/articles/read/11832. 
23
 Id. 
24 Citizen Petition from Earthjustice, to Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, Environmental 
Protection Agency (Aug. 4, 2011) at 14 [hereinafter Earthjustice Petition], available at 
earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/fracking_petition.pdf  
25
 Product manufacturers are required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(“OSHA”) to produce MSDS’s in order inform employees who handle toxic chemicals about the 
content of and risks associated with those chemicals. See Colborn, Kwiatkowski, Shultz & 
Bachran, supra note 10, at 1. The health effects of each chemical disclosed were determined by 
the MSDSs themselves, published scientific studies, or publicly available databases. Id. MSDSs 
do not disclose the entire composition of the product, however, because the manufacturer often 
labels the product, at its own discretion, as proprietary or not hazardous. TEDX found that 
MSDSs of 43% of the products used in fracking reported only 1% of the total composition of the 
product. See id. at 1, 2. 
26 Colborn, Kwiatkowski, Shultz & Bachran, supra note 10. 
 7 
gastrointestinal issues.
27
  Despite the TEDX study and others like it, full knowledge of other 
possible health risks is largely inadequate because companies tend to rely heavily on trade secret 
exemptions to disclosure requirements, depriving scientists of the information they need to 
collect data on health effects.
28
   
Even the EPA has been frustrated in its efforts to monitor fracking chemicals.  There is 
controversy over the agency will publish results of the years-long study it recently completed on 
fracking’s impact on drinking water.  The EPA is currently unable to publish the findings 
because companies claimed the majority of information they provided to the EPA for the study 
as “confidential business information.”29   
Non-disclosure not only impedes scientific investigation but also poses a more immediate 
burden on citizens themselves.  Citizens are unable whether fracking fluids have entered their 
water supply because they do not know for which chemicals to look.
30
  Also, citizens are 
deprived of knowledge directly bearing on health problems.  For example, in April 2008, a gas 
industry employee was admitted to an intensive care unit in Colorado after being caught in a 
fracking fluid spill.
31
  The nurse who treated the patient began vomiting a few days later and her 
skin turned yellow.  She was admitted to the ICU and subsequently diagnosed with chemical 
                                                        
27 Id. 
28
 See, e.g. Ben Elgin, Benjamin Haas, and Phil Kuntz, Fracking Secrets by Thousands Keep 
U.S. Clueless on Wells, Bloomberg (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-
11-30/frack-secrets-by-thousands-keep-u-dot-s-dot-clueless-on-wells#p1 (“Nationally, 
companies claimed trade secrets or otherwise failed to identify the chemicals they used about 
22% of the time”). 
29
 See Rob Wile, The EPA Hasn’t Figured Out How to Publish Results Of Its Fracking Chemical 
Study Without Spilling Trade Secrets, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/fracking-fluid-disclosure-epa-2012-12. 
30 Id. See also Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent In a 
Fracturing Energy Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV 1, 2 (2011) (“Unless Congress or state 
legislatures partially remove trade secret protections from fracing fluids, communities . . . may 
have inadequate tools to evaluate and address the potential impact of this development). 
31
 Id. 
 8 
poisoning.
32
 It was later determined that the employee she was treating was contaminated with a 
product known as “ZetaFlow,” a fracking fluid produced by Weatherford.33  When doctors 
looked at the MSDS for ZetaFlow, it indicated that ZetaFlow contained methanol and two 
undisclosed “proprietary” chemicals that the manufacturer refused to disclose.34  To this day, the 
Colorado nurse has no way of knowing exactly what landed her in the ICU.  The incident in 
Colorado illustrates the consequences of a legal regime that favors secrecy over disclosure.
35
 
 
B. WHO REGULATES FRACKING? 
At first blush, it appears that the Safe Water Drinking Act (“SDWA”), which specifically 
covers “the underground injection of . . . fluids which are brought to the surface in connection 
with oil or natural gas production”,36 would cover fracking operations.  However, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 amended the SDWA to explicitly remove injections used in fracking from 
within its reach.
37
  This exclusion is known as the “Halliburton loophole,” named after “the 
world’s largest provider of fracking services” which was led by former Vice President Dick 
Cheney before he served as Vice President.
38
  Other federal laws that regulate hazardous 
                                                        
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. 
35 See Mary L. Lyndon, supra note 2, at 450. (“the social costs of the . . . secret become greater 
with the passage of time, as the effect becomes more costly to identify and remedy”) 
36
 42 U.S.C. § 300(h)-4(a)(1).   
 
37 PL 109-58, Sec. 322 (providing that “the underground injection of fluids . . . pursuant to 
hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities” is 
excluded from the Safe Drinking Water Act.); see also Van Ort, supra note ____ at 454 
(“[T]here are chemicals that are carcinogens or hazardous air pollutants that are used in fracking 
but not regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act.”).   
38 Mark Drajem and Katarzyna Klimasinska, EPA Shrinking “Halliburton Loophole” Threatens 
Obama Gas Pledge, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
02-01/epa-shrinking-halliburton-loophole-threatens-obama-gas-pledge.html 
 9 
chemicals, such as the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 
(“EPCRA”), the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), and OSHA, may or may not touch of 
fracking operations depending on the specific circumstances pertaining to each operation, and 
nevertheless contain their own disclosure exemptions for trade secrets.  There are therefore no 
specific disclosure requirements for fracking operations under federal law.
39
  The states, rather 
than the federal government, are therefore responsible for enacting regulations governing 
fracking operations.   
States differ widely on how much detail companies must disclose about their operations and 
to whom.
40
  States vary, for example, on whether disclosure of chemical compositions must be 
made directly to the public by posing the information on public chemical registries, to a state 
agency, or to nobody at all.
41
  More than half of the states which require disclosure, including 
Pennsylvania, provide some level of protection for companies claiming their products are trade 
secrets.
 42
  
 
i. PENNSYLVANIA’S REGULATORY REGIME FOR FRACKING 
Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Laws43  regulate petroleum extraction.  They include strict 
permitting and inspection provisions .
44
 On February 14, 2012, Governor Tom Corbett signed 
                                                        
39 See Wiseman, supra note ___ at 5.  
40
 BRANDON J. MURRILL & ADAM VANN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING: CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 12 (2012) (explaining that chemical 
disclosure laws at the state level vary widely). 
41 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.10 (West 2012).  
42 MURILL AND VANN, supra note 37, at 8. 
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 et seq. (West 2012). 
44
 See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211 (“no personal shall drill or alter a well . . . without 
having first obtained a well permit . . .”); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 3258(a.1) (“[t]he operator may 
not commence drilling activities until the department has conducted an inspection of the 
unconventional well site . . .”).  
 10 
House Bill 1950, currently known as Act 13, into law.  Act 13, which modified and augmented 
Title 58, went into effect in April 2012.
45
  Perhaps the most pronounced change brought by Act 
13 were well fees imposed on fracking operators.  Many were disappointed the well fees 
collected were not set aside for health related studies, even though early versions of the law 
earmarked money for research into natural gas drilling’s medical impact.46  Instead, the money is 
allocated to state agencies, grants, and municipalities.  
The other significant changes brought by Act 13 were disclosure requirements aimed 
participants in fracking operations.  Specifically, Act 13 requires a fracking well operator to 
complete a chemical disclosure registry form and post the form on the state’s chemical disclosure 
registry.
47
 Information posted on that registry will become public record unless such information 
is “entitled” to protection as a trade secret or “deemed confidential proprietary information.” Act 
13 does not provide a definition for “trade secret,” nor does it provide any mechanism for agency 
approval or challenge to a company’s trade secrecy claim.  In other words, a fracking well 
operator may claim any information as a trade secret or “confidential proprietary information” by 
simply submitting a signed written statement to that effect.
48
  
In addition to requiring disclosure to the Commonwealth’s agencies and registries, Act 13 
also requires that “[a] vendor, service company or operator shall identify the specific identity and 
amount of any chemicals claimed to be a trade secret or confidential proprietary information to 
any health professional who requests the information in writing if the health professional 
                                                        
45
 See 2012 Pa. Legisl. Serv. Act 2012-13 (H.B. 1950) (West). 
46 Scott Detrow, Top Republican Floats Proposal to Create Marcellus Shale Health Panel, 
STATEIMPACT.NPR.ORG (Sept. 26, 2012, 1:21 PM), 
http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2012/09/26/top-republican-floats-proposal-to-create-
marcellus-shale-health-panel/ 
47
 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3221.1(b)(2) (West 2012).  
48
 Id. §3221.1(b). 
 11 
executes a confidentiality agreement and provides a written statement of need.”49  The law 
somewhat relaxes the formalities in the case of medical emergencies by requiring the company to 
turn over the information upon a doctor’s mere “verbal agreement” that he or she will not use the 
information for “purposes other than the health needs asserted.”50  Still, if the company so 
requests, a confidentiality agreement may be executed in this situation “as soon as circumstances 
permit.”51 These provisions of Act 13 have been referred to by some doctors and citizens as “the 
medical gag rule.”  Act 13 has been heavily criticized for being a law that, on its face, places 
secrecy before public health and safety.
52
  
ii. The Legal Challenge to Pennsylvania’s Medical Gag Rule  
On July 27, 2012, Dr. Alfonso Rodriguez, a Pennsylvania resident and president of the 
Gas Drilling Awareness Coalition, brought suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
seeking to invalidate a portion of its fracking law as unconstitutional under the First Amendment 
free speech clause.
 53
  The specific portion Rodriguez is challenging, known as the “medical gag 
rule,” requires a fracking company to provide to medical professionals information about the 
chemicals used in the operation if medical need so requires, but allows the company require a 
                                                        
49 Id. §3221.1(b)(10) (emphasis added). 
50
 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §3221.1(b)(11) (West 2012). 
51
 Id. §3221.1(b)(11). 
 
52 See Bernard Goldstein and Jill Kriesky, The Pennsylvania Gas Law Fails to Protect Public 
Health, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 11, 2012), http://old.post-
gazette.com/pg/12071/1215612-109.stm (“[r]ather than providing health personnel with direction 
on how to prepare for potential exposures to toxic chemicals . . . [Act 13] sets up an obstacle 
course that health care providers must navigate to secure information about proprietary 
chemicals.”); See Steven Rosenfeld, Fracking Democracy: Why Pennsylvania’s Act 13 May be 
the Nation’s Worst Corporate Give Away, ALTERNET (Mar. 7, 2012) 
http://www.alternet.org/story/154459/fracking_democracy%3A_why_pennsylvania%27s_act_13
_may_be_the_nation%27s_worst_corporate_giveaway  (“Act 13 does many things to elevate the 
rights of gas companies above the civil rights of people and communities”)  
53
 See Complaint, Rodriguez v. Krancer, No. 12-1468 (M.D.Pa. filed July 27, 2012).   
 
 12 
confidentiality agreement from the doctor if it believes the information provided contains trade 
secrets. Rodriguez is one of many doctors throughout the Commonwealth that perceives the 
medical gag rule not only as a violation of free speech, but a threat to their ethical and legal 
obligations.
54
  On October 16, 2012, Linda Kelly, the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, 
filed a motion to dismiss Rodriguez’s complaint.  In her brief, Kelly argues that the 
Commonwealth could not mandate unqualified disclosure from fracking participants without 
unconstitutionally “infringing on the . . . property rights of third parties.”55  While not explicit in 
her brief, Kelly’s argument presumably rests on the fact a trade secret is considered property 
under Pennsylvania law.
56
  Therefore, in light of specific constitutional doctrines protecting 
property, the Commonwealth might (arguably) enact and enforce measures in furtherance of that 
right, even at the price of inhibiting free speech. 
The gravamen of Rodriguez’s complaint is that the medical gag rule presents an 
impediment to the proper practice of medicine.  Rodriguez cites specific principles of the Ethics 
Code, promulgated by the American Medical Association, that inform his “professional and 
ethical obligation to communicate critical data and information obtained in the course of treating 
his patients, such as known environmental dangers, to other medical doctors, researchers, and the 
general public for the purpose of advancing scientific knowledge.”57  For example, Rodriguez 
cites Principle V of the Ethics Code, which requires doctors to “study, apply, and advance 
                                                        
54
 Susan Phillips, Pennsylvania Doctors Worry Over Fracking ‘Gag Rule’, NPR (May 17, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/05/17/152268501/pennsylvania-doctors-worry-over-fracking-gag-rule 
(stating that “[a] new law in Pennsylvania has doctors nervous).  
55 See Brief of Defendant Linda Kelly at 8, Rodriguez v. Krancer, No. 12-1468 (M.D. Pa., filed 
October 31, 2012). 
56 See Kurt M. Saunders, Can You Keep A (Trade) Secret?—The Pennsylvania Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, 75 PA B.A. Q. 139, 140 (“Pennsylvania courts have taken the position that legal 
protection for trade secrets derives from their status as a variety of intellectual property, rather 
than from the relationship between the parties.”).   
57
 Complaint at ¶ 6, Rodriguez v. Krancer, No. 12-1468 (M.D. Pa. filed July 27, 2012).  
 13 
scientific knowledge, maintain a commitment to medical education, make relevant information 
available to patients, colleagues, and the public, obtain consultation, and use the talents of other 
health professionals when indicated.”58  He urges that violation of these professional standards 
could lead to revocation of his license to practice medicine in Pennsylvania.
59
   
Had Rodriguez’s complaint consisted solely of the argument that the medical gag rule 
infringes on the doctor-patient relationship and forces doctors to violate the Ethics Code, he 
would not have a cognizable grounds upon which to invalidate Act 13.  A similar issue arises in 
the context of contractual gag clauses imposed upon the health care providers by managed care 
organizations (“MCOs”) with whom they contract.  As discussed by Julia A. Martin and Lisa K. 
Bjerknes, such gag clauses “violate the patient’s rights under the doctrines of informed consent, 
fiduciary duty and perhaps malpractice.”60  Because of the absence of a common-law or 
constitutional doctrine that protects the doctor-patient relationship in particular, some states, 
including Pennsylvania, had to pass legislation in order to invalidate MCO gag clauses that 
prevent a health care provider from engaging in certain communication with patients.  The 
legislation allows a health care provider to “file a grievance” pursuant to the statute if he or she 
believes the gag clause is interfering with his or her doctor-patient relationship.
61
  In the absence 
such affirmative legislation, however, particularly narrow instances of interference with the 
doctor-patient relationship, there is no broad avenue to address the problem.  
Rodriguez does have an actionable claim against Act 13, however, because he also 
alleges that the medical gag rule is a “content-based regulation of speech” that violates his free 
                                                        
58
 Complaint at ¶ 47(citing AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics (1952)).    
59
 Id. at ¶ 15. 
60
 Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Obligations of Gag Clauses in 
Physician Contracts, 22 Am. J. L. & Med. 433, 449. (1996) 
61
 § 991.2113  
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speech rights by under the First Amendment.
62
  Before the First Amendment can be invoked to 
mitigate the damaging effects of the medical gag rule, it must first be determined, as a threshold 
matter, whether the provision is the sort that triggers First Amendment protection.
63
  
 
PART II: DOES THE MEDICAL GAG RULE IMPLICATE THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT? 
The goal of the free speech clause is geared less toward maintaining individual autonomy 
and more toward providing public access to a rich marketplace of ideas by fostering “discussion, 
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.”64  One of the main rationales underlying 
freedom of speech is that society will benefit and flourish from uninhibited discourse among its 
citizens.
65
   A state therefore may not infringe on speech because of its “message, subject-matter, 
or its content”66 unless it can satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.  In order to pass muster under 
strict scrutiny, the law must be “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government 
interest.”  In other words, “[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s 
purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.”67  
                                                        
62
 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  See Complaint, supra note 14. 
63
 As discussed in more detail in Part II, Section A below, “the physician’s right to discuss a 
patient’s treatment alternatives under the First Amendment is controversial.” Martin & Bjerknes 
at 460. The medical gag rule, however, implicates interests beyond the doctor-patient 
relationship, so the First Amendment remains a feasible grounds on which to challenge the law.    
64
 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).  
65 See Robert Post  
66
 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosely 408 US 92, 95 (1972).  
67 U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) 
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The Supreme Court and lower courts have struggled with the degree of protection 
warranted by speech between a professional and a client.
68
  In Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
69
 however, the Supreme Court discussed, albeit tersely, 
whether speech occurring within the doctor-patient relationship implicates the interests 
underlying free speech and thus warrants First Amendment protection.  The Court concluded that 
speech occurring in the doctor-patient setting is not entitled to First Amendment protection, and 
is therefore “subject to reasonable . . . regulation by the State.”70  The Court’s conclusion in 
Casey is likely a recognition that “traditional First Amendment values . . . seem to carry very 
little force in the context of professional speech.”71  That is, “private, professional 
communications between doctors and their patients plainly do not count as public discourse” that 
enhances the marketplace of ideas.
72
 
Despite the notion that professional speech lacks free speech value, Act 13 reaches speech 
that takes place outside the bounds of the doctor-patient relationship.  That is, the medical gag 
                                                        
68
 See generally Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV 939 (2007); see also Daniel Halberstam, 
Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, U. 
147 U. PA. L. REV 771, 834 (1999) (“[T]he Supreme Court and lower courts have rarely 
addressed the First Amendment contours of a professional's freedom to speak to a client.”).  
69 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
70 Id. at 884.  The Supreme Court in Casey upheld a state statute requiring doctors to provide 
state-mandated information to patients seeking an abortion.  
71 Post at 951.  See also Daniel Halberstam, supra note 67 at 832 (“[T]he speech . . . between 
physician and patient, lies beyond the traditional conception of unbounded public discourse, 
because it takes place as part of a predefined communicative project”) 
72
 Post at 973.  Post explains the view that “because the First Amendment value of such speech is 
different from that of public discourse, it receives a ‘subordinate’ kind of constitutional 
protection that is structurally distinct from the protections accorded to public discourse.”  
Scholars have attacked the lack of First Amendment protection the Court gives private speech, 
arguing that while the public form “is indeed the catalyst for much discussion of public matters,” 
important exchanges often take place “among people in much more cloistered settings.”  See 
Frederick Schauer, “Private” Speech and the “Private” Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School 
District, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 236 (1979).  
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rule controls how doctors can use information about chemical formulas in general.   Data and 
facts, such as chemical formulas, while generally devoid of opinion and viewpoint, nevertheless 
further some of the major goals of free speech: namely, truth-seeking and public debate.  In fact, 
in her brief, the Attorney General recognized that Rodriguez wanted to use information about the 
chemical formulas contained in fracking fluid to “further his own personal and political views 
regarding hydraulic fracturing and the development of the oil and gas industry in 
Pennsylvania.”73   
Because of the potential free speech value of data and facts, courts apply the strict scrutiny 
standard to laws that suppress the dissemination of such information.
74 
 To illustrate, suppose a 
state imposed a ban on imparting any data relating to the field of quantum mechanics.  This 
restriction on dissemination of scientific fact would be content-based and thus subject to strict 
scrutiny under the First Amendment.  The medical gag rule presents a slightly different, yet 
constitutionally significant, restriction: the state is dictating how information with certain content 
can and cannot be used.  Another aspect of the medical gag rule that differs from the simple 
example given above and complicates the First Amendment inquiry is the fact that the rule 
restricts information that doctors obtain through state-mandated disclosure rather than individual 
knowledge or discovery.  In her brief in support of her motion to dismiss, the Attorney General 
argues that the medical gag rule does not infringe on Rodriguez’s First Amendment rights 
because “[w]ithout [the medical gag rule], Dr. Rodriguez and other doctors would simply have 
                                                        
73 Brief for Defendant Linda L. Kelly in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 7, Rodriguez v. 
Krancer, No. 12-1458 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2012), ECF No. 10. 
74
 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US 768, 762 (1976) (citing 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 US 809, 822 (1975)) (“purely factual matter of public interest may 
claim protection”). 
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no means to obtain valuable information for medical purposes.”75  The Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health,
76
 however, suggests that this nuance does not insulate the law 
from invalidation on First Amendment grounds.  
A. The Circuit Split Over Prescription Confidentiality Laws and the Supreme Court’s 
Ultimate Resolution in Sorrell v. IMS Health 
When doctors write prescriptions, state and federal laws require them to provide prescriber-
identifying information (“PI”) to the pharmacy filling the prescription.77  It is common in the 
pharmaceutical industry that data mining companies purchase this information from pharmacies 
and sell it to pharmaceutical manufacturers.  Through this information, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers learn “physicians' prescribing patterns in terms of gross number of prescriptions 
and inclination to prescribe a particular drug” in order to refine and target their marketing 
practices.
78
  Several states, beginning with New Hampshire, followed by Maine and Vermont, 
passed statutes restricting this particular use of PI.
79
  New Hampshire’s law imposed a flat ban 
on the use and transmission of PI for commercial purposes.
80
 Maine’s law deviated in an 
important way from New Hampshire’s: its default position was to allow use and transmission of 
PI for commercial purposes unless a physician elected to prevent pharmaceutical companies 
from using or selling their particularized information for marketing purposes.
81
  Both the New 
                                                        
75
 Brief for Defendant Linda L. Kelly in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 8, Rodriguez v. 
Krancer, No. 12-1458 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2012), ECF No. 10. 
76 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).  
77
 Id. at 2660. 
78 631 F.Supp.2d 434, 441 (D. Vt. 2009), rev’d, 630 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S.Ct 
2653 (2011).  
79 Id at 442-44.  
80 Id at 442. 
81 Id at 442-43.  
 18 
Hampshire and Main District Courts invalidated the laws for violating the First Amendment, and 
the First Circuit reversed.
82
 
Vermont’s PI law (hereinafter “Act 80”) was neither a flat ban nor an “opt-out” law against 
the sale or use of PI data for marketing.  Instead, Vermont’s law is “opt-in”—that is, entities are 
prohibited from selling or using PI data for marketing purposes unless the prescriber consents.
83
  
On the other hand, Act 80 carved out certain uses of PI that did not require any consent from a 
prescribing physician: researching health care, complying with health insurance companies’ 
preferred drug lists, and educating doctors about cost-effective ways to prescribe medication.
84
  
The stated purposes of Act 80 were: “to protect the privacy of medical information; to promote 
public health by ensuring that prescription decisions are based on scientific evidence, rather than 
one-sided marketing pitches; and to help contain health care costs by encouraging prescription of 
cheaper, generic drugs.”85   
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and data miners brought an action challenging the 
constitutionality of Act 80.
86
  The state advanced two arguments to the Supreme Court for Act 80 
did not implicate the First Amendment: (1) the statute was a restriction on “nonpublic 
information” and (2) regardless of the type of information the statute sought to reach, the law did 
                                                        
82 Id at 443. 
83 See VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18 §463(d)(2009), invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. 
Ct. 2653 (pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall not use prescriber-
identifiable information for marketing or promoting a prescription unless the prescriber 
consents”) (emphasis added).  
84 Sorrell page 2660. 
85 Marcia M. Boumil, Kaitlyn Dunn, Nancy Ryan & Katrina Clearwater, Prescription Data 
Mining, Medical Privacy and the First Amendment: The U.S. Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 447, 448 (2012) (citing Sorrell at 2661).  
86
 631 F.Supp.2d 434, 444 (D. Vt. 2009), rev’d, 630 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S.Ct 
2653 (2011). 
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not restrict protected expression because it involved mere commercial conduct.
 87
  As to the 
state’s “non-public information” argument, the Supreme Court noted that once information 
reaches private hands, regardless of its source, the “individual’s right to speak is implicated” by 
laws restricting or preventing dissemination of that information.
88
  Perhaps most relevant for 
First Amendment analysis of the medical gag rule was the Supreme Court’s holding that because 
the law allowed the information to be used for some purposes but not for others, it “impose[d] 
burdens that [we]re based on the content of speech and that [we]re aimed a particular 
viewpoint.”89  In other words, the Court believed it was improper for the state to ban information 
from being used in a way that the legislature found distasteful, while allowing the same 
information to be used for purposes the legislature found beneficial. 
B. Comparing and Contrasting Act 80 and the Medical Gag Rule to Determine 
Whether the Medical Gag Rule Implicates the First Amendment and Warrants 
Strict Scrutiny Thereunder     
Act 80 and the medical gag rule have in common many key characteristics that suggest the 
Supreme Court would treat them similarly for purposes of First Amendment analysis.  For 
example, like Act 80, the medical gag rule utilizes the “opt-in” mechanism, which “more closely 
resembles . . . [a] total ban than does . . . [a] more limited, opt-out approach.”90  Also, both laws 
pick and choose the purposes for which PI can be used without first obtaining a prescriber’s 
consent.  In her brief, the Attorney General suggests that the medical gag rule does not infringe 
                                                        
87
 Boumil, Dunn, Ryan & Clearwater, supra note 57, at 475. 
88 Sorrell at 2665.  
89 Sorrell at 2663-4. Because the Court concluded that the law could not even survive 
intermediate scrutiny, an analysis under strict scrutiny would have been futile. Therefore, the 
Court did not ultimately engage in a strict scrutiny analysis despite explicitly concluding that the 
law required heightened scrutiny. 
90
 Boumil, Dunn, Ryan & Clearwater, supra note 57, at 455-56. 
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on free speech because “[t]here is nothing which would suggest that [a doctor] would be 
penalized for using this information for the medical treatment of his patients”.91  Even though the 
permissible uses of PI under Act 80 were those that were aimed to benefit society, the Supreme 
Court nonetheless concluded that it is constitutionally impermissible to single out the ways in 
which information can and cannot be used, regardless of the state’s apparent benevolence in 
doing so.  In light of this holding, the medical gag rule is not insulated from First Amendment 
scrutiny merely because it allows doctors to use the chemical formulas to address a pressing 
medical need.  Finally, both Act 80 and the medical gag rule regulate the use of information that 
was obtained only by virtue of other laws mandating disclosure of the information. 
   Admittedly, Act 80 and the medical gag rule do differ from each other in significant ways.  
Most of the points on which the two laws differ, however, actually suggest that the medical gag 
rule deserves even greater scrutiny than Act 80 under the First Amendment.  Act 80 inhibited 
borderline “commercial speech,” which has typically been viewed as deserving less 
constitutional protection than other types of speech.  The Supreme Court nevertheless found it 
antithetical to the First Amendment.
 92
  The medical gag rule, on the other hand, appears to 
prohibit doctors from using the formulas disclosed to them for a much broader range of purposes, 
including scientific debate. The Natural Resources Defense Council explained that disclosure of 
the chemicals used in fracking is important because “[a] robust public disclosure regime is 
essential for scientific research that will provide a better understanding of the cumulative 
                                                        
91
 Brief for Defendant Linda L. Kelly in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 6, Rodriguez v. 
Krancer, No. 12-1458 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2012), ECF No. 10. 
92
 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of NY, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 
(1980) (explaining that the “Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech 
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression,” and establishing a separate and less 
demanding standard under which to analyze constitutionality of burden on commercial speech). 
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audience. Id at 561. 
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environmental and health effects of fracking and serve as a basis for well-informed policies to 
protect the public.”93  Such a broad prohibition necessarily impedes at least two fundamental 
goals of free speech: the “marketplace of ideas” and the promotion of truth-seeking.   
The other differences between Act 80 and the medical gag rule are subtle ones that do not 
bear on whether the First Amendment can or cannot be applied.  For example, Act 80 directly 
banned certain uses of information by imposing civil penalties on anyone who violated its 
provisions, while the medical gag rule indirectly burdens speech via confidentiality agreement.  
However, the fact that a law indirectly burdens rather than directly bans speech is not material in 
determining whether the law is repugnant to the First Amendment.
94
  Further, unlike Act 80, the 
medical gag rule was not accompanied by “legislative findings” in which the state expressed its 
disdain and distrust for certain uses of fracking fluids.
95
   It is apparent, however, that these 
legislative findings were not necessary to the Court’s holding, for the Court mentioned the 
legislative findings only after concluding that “[t]he law on its face burdens disfavored speech by 
disfavored speakers.”96  Thus, the fact that Pennsylvania’s legislature has not been as explicit 
                                                        
93 State Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Rules and Enforcement: A Comparison, NATURAL 
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNSEL, http://www.nrdc.org/energy/fracking-disclosure.asp 
94
 United States v. Playboy Ent’mt Group, Inc  
95 To illustrate the nature of the legislative findings set forth by the Vermont legislature, an 
example of one of the findings is provided: “The marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and 
effectiveness is frequently one-sided in that brand-name companies invest in expensive 
pharmaceutical marketing campaigns to doctors. The one-sided nature of the marketing leads to 
doctors prescribing drugs based on incomplete and biased information, particularly for 
prescribers that lack the time to perform substantive research assessing whether the messages 
they are receiving from pharmaceutical representatives are full and accurate.” 2007 Vt. No. 80, § 
1(4). 
96 Sorrell at 2663.  The Court explains that although the “‘inevitable effect’” of a law may 
render it unconstitutional without any examination of the state’s motive for enacting it, the Court 
may still consider a statute’s stated purposes.  Id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 US 367, 
384 (1968)). 
 22 
about its legislative intent as has Vermont’s does not mean that a Court cannot find the medical 
gag rule unconstitutional based on its effect alone.  
C. APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY TO THE MEDICAL GAG RULE 
i. Is Pennsylvania’s Interest in Protecting the Fracking Industry’s Trade Secrets 
a Compelling One? 
The Supreme Court has identified a compelling interest as one that is “of the highest order.”97  
In fact, the rigorous standard a state must satisfy to show a compelling governmental interest is 
likely the reason why strict scrutiny is often described as “strict in theory and fatal in fact.”98  
The question that must be answered is whether a state’s interest in protecting trade secrets is 
compelling enough to justify infringement of free speech.   
Both the states and the federal government have a long history of providing legal protection 
for trade secrets of companies and individuals.  For example, 47 states, including Pennsylvania, 
and the District of Columbia have adopted statutes modeled after UTSA.
99
  The few states that 
have not adopted UTSA continue to provide trade secret protection through the traditional 
common law of trade secrecy.
100
  While the long tradition of trade secrecy law might seem to 
suggest that the government’s interest in protecting trade secrets is of quite a “high order,” an in-
depth examination of trade secrecy doctrines reveals that trade secret protection is itself not 
                                                        
97
 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) 
98
 Gerald Gunter, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for 
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).  
99 Melvin F. Jager 1 Trade Secrets Law § 3:29. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act was formed by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in order to provide 
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absolute, so there is little reason to believe that trade secrecy interests are strong enough to trump 
First Amendment infringement.
101
 
Unlike a patent, an owner’s rights in his or her trade secret rights are not exclusive but are 
instead protected against appropriation only by “unfair of nefarious means,” such as industrial 
espionage.
102
  The Restatement (First) of Torts explains that with respect to a trade secret, an 
“actor is free to engage in any proper conduct for the very purpose of discovering the secret.”103  
Among such proper means of discovering the secret explicitly listed in both the Restatement and 
the UTSA is reverse engineering, which involves “intentional access to another’s product for the 
purpose of lawfully discerning what it is, how it was made, how it works, and what its 
advantages and limitations may be.”104  The law also allows discovery of the trade secret through 
independent lab research or inadvertent disclosure by the holder.
105
  Further illustrating the 
flexibility of trade secret protection is the principle that “[a] privilege is likely to be recognized . 
. . in connection with the disclosure of information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to 
the commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public concern.”106  For 
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 This section of the Note will examine trade secrecy law largely by analyzing common-law 
doctrines.  While the vast majority of states no longer follow the common law approach to trade 
secrecy, the principles embodied in the Restatements have persisted throughout most of the 
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See  Dan L. Burk, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology Licensing, 4 ALB. L.J. 
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 Peter J. Courture page 618.  
105 Restatement (First) of Torts §757 cmt a.  
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 Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition cmt c. See also Philip Morris, Inc v. Reilly 312 F.3d  
 24 
example, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition notes that “[a] privilege is likely to be 
recognized . . . in connection with the disclosure of information that is relevant to public health 
or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public 
concern.”107   Trade secrecy is subordinated even when the societal interests at stake are not 
constitutionally significant.  The limits embedded in trade secrecy law are evidence that a state’s 
interest in protecting trade secrets is not unyieldingly imperative, at least to the degree that would 
justify infringing on First Amendment rights.  
Not only must the state’s interest be a compelling one, but it must also be genuine.108 That is, 
the purpose behind the law must actually be what the state claims it is.  Even assuming arguendo 
that a court could find a state’s interest in protecting trade secrets a compelling one, it would 
likely not be satisfied that Pennsylvania’s purported interest, though compelling, is genuine.   
There is an abundance of evidence that the medical gag rule may have been the result of a 
political bargaining and nepotism for the natural gas industry.  Act 13 was proposed by 
Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives, which is controlled by Republicans.  It was signed into 
law by Pennsylvania’s Republican Governor Tom Corbett despite opposition from most House 
democrats.
109
  Because many participants in the oil industry have made large contributions to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
24 (appellants relying on the Restatement (First) of Torts §757 cmt d. to argue that the state of 
Massachusetts “has long established that in can require public disclosure of trade secrets to 
advance public health and safety.”) 
107
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 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
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ENVIRONMENT DIGEST (Nov. 7, 2011), 
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political action committees of Governor Corbett and many Republican legislators, it is highly 
likely that the medical gag rule and other provisions favoring the fracking industry are the 
party’s way of thanking the oil industry.110  Doug Shields, Pittsburgh’s City Council President, 
claims that Act 13 was essentially “written by the oil and gas industry” with an eye toward 
avoiding tort liability for spills, accidents, and health problems created by its fracking 
operations.
111
  Shields explains that in particular, the medical gag rule is a huge advantage to 
fracking companies because “if the information is locked away behind confidentiality 
agreements,” bringing a civil suit becomes extremely difficult.112   In fact, by participating in the 
American Legislative Exchange Counsel (“ALEC”), many oil companies indeed authored many 
states’ fracking laws, including those of Pennsylvania.  ALEC is a conservative pro-business 
organization whose members consist of large corporations such as ExxonMobil, the country’s 
largest producer of shale gas, and Republican legislators from various states.
 113
  One of ALEC’s 
roles is drafting model bills “that broadly advance a pro-business, socially conservative 
agenda.”114 ALEC’s model fracking bill, the “Hydraulic Fracturing Fluid Disclosure 
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Composition Act”, was adopted by several states that regulate fracking, including 
Pennsylvania.
115
  
ii. Even if a Court were to Find that Pennsylvania’s Interest in Providing 
Trade Secret Protection is Both Compelling and Genuine, Is the Medical Gag 
Rule Narrowly Tailored to Serve that Interest?    
A trade secret is “any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other 
enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic 
advantage over others.”116  Trade secret laws “punish industrial espionage and deny competitors 
an advantage they have obtained by unfair means.”117  Trade secret law is thus aimed largely at 
preventing commercial exploitation of a party’s economically valuable trade secret—hence why 
trade secret law “requires a level of culpability”, while copyright and patent infringement are 
strict liability offenses.
118
 
Despite the culpability requirement of trade secret law, there is no language in the medical 
gag rule that limits it to situations in which the recipient poses an economic threat.  It is highly 
unlikely that health care providers want to sell or use the chemical formulas for unfair economic 
purposes.
119
  Instead, as stated by Rodriguez in his complaint, doctors want to use the 
information they obtain from the companies to “alert the public, in the broadest possible manner, 
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of known dangers posed by high-volume [fracking], and the . . . health risks imposed on the 
community.”120  The fact that Rodriguez wants to disclose the information to the public at large 
further weakens any threat of economic exploitation.  As Pamela Samuelson explains, 
“misappropriators generally have the same interest as the secret’s developer in maintaining 
secrecy” for two reasons: (1) misappropriators want to reap full benefit from free-riding on the 
trade secret by excluding other companies from using it, and (2) revealing secrets to the public 
would increase the likelihood of detection by the owner of the trade secret.
121
  The medical gag 
rule therefore reaches an unnecessarily broad class of actors to achieve its goal of protecting 
trade secrecy in light of the minimal threat posed by doctors to whom economically valuable 
information is disclosed.  
Not only is the medical gag rule overly broad and inaccurate with regard to the type of actors 
it targets, but it is also overly broad with regard to the information it seeks to protect.  That is, the 
medical gag rule reaches information that is unlikely to be considered a trade secret under 
relevant law.  To illustrate, current Pennsylvania law provides that “the crucial indicia for 
determining whether certain information constitutes a trade secret are ‘substantial secrecy’ and 
‘competitive value to the owner’.”122  This view is also embraced by most states and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
123
   As to whether the chemical composition of fracking fluids is 
substantially secret, according to Rodriguez, the “general ‘recipe’ of hydraulic fracturing fluid is 
common knowledge within the gas drilling industry.”124  Additionally, Phil Rossi, attorney for 
Dr. Rodriguez, has said that the chemical formulas have “nothing to do with proprietary 
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information,” and “none of [it] is secret to the people in the industry.”125  It is unlikely that a 
competitor would benefit from learning the chemical composition of a particular fracking fluid 
because  “[d]ifferent shale formations, and even different well sites within one formation, may 
require different chemicals.”126  Thus, any competitor who learned the composition of a fracking 
fluid used in one operation could not that formula in other wells.   Further, revealing a mere list 
of chemical ingredients would not be the same as revealing a chemical formula, so the threat of 
free-riding on another company’s invention is virtually non-existent.   To be sure, there may 
exist some circumstances in which a fracking fluid’s formula constitutes a valuable trade secret.  
The problem with the medical gag rule, however, is it is not narrowly tailored to reach only those 
types of circumstances.  Despite the medical gag rule’s constitutional infirmities, fracking 
companies may have a property interest in their chemical formulas that trumps any competing 
free speech concern.  
PART III: Balancing Property Rights and Free Expression 
 A common defense of trade secret exemptions in disclosure laws is that they prevent the 
trade secret holder from asserting a constitutional-takings claim against the government.
127
   In 
her brief, the Attorney General asserts that the medical gag rule is necessary to safeguard “the 
legitimate property rights of companies and individuals who have a vested right in maintaining 
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secrecy over techniques and products they have developed.”128  The Attorney General’s 
argument, however, is problematic for two reasons: (1) having concluded above that the law is 
violative of First Amendment rights, it must be established that such rights are limited by 
property rights and (2) even if that is established, fracking companies have relinquished the trade 
secrecy status of their fracking fluids and thus no longer have a property right therein.  
A. DO PROPERTY RIGHTS IN TRADE SECRETS TRUMP FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS? 
While courts have “shown a special solicitude for the guarantees of the First Amendment, 
th[e] Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of 
free speech on property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes 
only.”129  More specifically, the right to “exclude third parties from accessing, using or 
interfering with the property” is a “a basic component of a free society”.130  Thus, two prominent 
constitutional law professors have noted that “when free speech claims are weighed in the 
balance, property interests determine on which side of the scales ‘the thumb of the Court’ will be 
placed.”131  While it has been firmly established that, at least with respect to real property, the 
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scale weighs in favor of property rights, it is much less settled whether the same holds true for 
intangible property rights (i.e., intellectual property).
132
   
The debate among scholars on this topic has arisen in the context of preliminary 
injunctive relief for disclosure of informational trade secrets.  Preliminary (and permanent) 
injunctions are “routinely utilized to protect property interests.”133  It is unusual that a 
preliminary injunction involving real or tangible property would conflict with free speech 
because such injunctions usually target conduct rather than speech. Thus, because of the 
similarities between real property and copyrights and trademarks, preliminary injunctions are 
often permitted in such disputes without any First Amendment concern.
134
  Other the other hand, 
in actions for libel, obscenity, and other kinds of unprotected speech, preliminary injunctions are 
virtually forbidden because they may “temporarily suppress speech that ultimately proves to be 
protected” since they are issued before the case is decided on the merits.135   This presumption 
against granting preliminary injunctions where speech is involved is known as the “prior restraint 
doctrine.”136  Damage caused by injurious speech such as defamation and libel is therefore 
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redressed post hoc through an action for damages.  The constitutionality of preliminary 
injunctions in trade secret disputes is less clear than the two extremes presented by property 
interests and injunctions restricting injurious speech.  Like confidentiality agreements, 
preliminary injunctions restrain the future use and disclosure of trade secrets.   
One side of the debate argues that trade secret claims and remedies, including preliminary 
injunctions, are immune from First Amendment scrutiny.  The arguments in support of this view 
echo the notion that property interests trump free speech.  Professor Beckerman-Rodau argues 
that disclosure of a trade secret is “analogous to trespassing on real property.”137  Thus, he argues 
that the need to preserve “the private property interest embodied in a trade secret” via 
preliminary injunction justifies any incursion on speech.
138
   Professor Richard Epstein, another 
proponent of this of this view, explains that “[t]he suppression of the publication of stolen 
information does nothing to hamper the critic from denouncing any firm that chooses to preserve 
its trade secrets, or to chide any government agency for its lackluster enforcement of the general 
law” and therefore “the private interests against disclosure seem manifestly to outweigh the 
public interest for disclosure.”139  He also argues that restricting disclosure of trade secrets, at 
least those of regulated industries, is not harmful to society.  For example, the EPA and other 
agencies, although forbidden to disclose them to public, has access to the trade secrets of many 
industries and can examine them for any harmful effects it may have on health or the 
environment.
140
 Similarly, Professor Beckerman-Rodau argues that rights of exclusion, and thus, 
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preliminary injunctions, are as (if not more) important for trade secrets as they are for real 
property because of the need to preserve incentives to invest in innovation.
141
  
 This view is not without supporting case law.  In DVD Copy Control Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Bunner,
142
 the California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision that a 
preliminary injunction to prevent disclosure of trade secrets was unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment. The appellate court had decided that the injunction was a restraint on “pure speech” 
and the presumption against it could only be overcome by “an interest more fundamental than 
the First Amendment itself.”143 The California Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that 
the speech at issue was in fact protected by the First Amendment, but held that “[t]he First 
Amendment does not prohibit courts from incidentally enjoining speech in order to protect a 
legitimate property right.”144  Despite scattered examples of cases like Bunner, the application of 
the property-trumps-First-Amendment doctrine to trade secrets has never been explicitly adopted 
by the Supreme Court and has been criticized by scholars.
145
  
Critics of the approach described above believe that analogizing intellectual property to 
tangible property is not enough to avoid the First Amendment dangers posed by preliminary 
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injunctions in intellectual property disputes.  Professors Lemley and Volokh argue that even if 
one accepts that copyrights, patents, and trade secrets are equivalent to tangible property, 
preliminary injunctions in intellectual property cases are nevertheless “content-based” 
restrictions “specifically targeted at speech” and thus raise free speech concerns.146  Professors 
Lemley and Volokh argue that copyrighted material and trade secrets often consists of “socially 
significant” speech involving art, entertainment, comedy, and political speech, the restriction of 
which is repugnant to free speech values.
147
  Aside from scholarly discourse supporting this 
view, there is some case law favoring this approach.  For example in Ford Motor Co. v. Lane,
 148
 
the court found that a preliminary injunction restricting defendant from publishing Ford’s trade 
secrets would be an invalid prior restraint of free speech in violation of the First Amendment.  In 
Ford, defendant got a hold of Ford’s trade secrets through anonymous sources and published 
them on his website.  Even though the court conceded that defendant’s actions likely violated 
trade secret law, it held that Ford’s commercial interest in its trade secrets was not to justify a 
prior restraint on free speech.  
Even if one were to take the side of the debate more favorable to fracking companies and 
argue that trade secrets are property interests whose preservation justifies free speech incursion, 
fracking companies may have lost the property interest in their trade secrets.  
B. Do Fracking Companies Possess a Property Interest in Their Trade Secrets? 
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,
149
 the Supreme Court explicitly recognized trade secrets as a 
form of property protected by the Fifth Amendment “takings” clause if the particular state in 
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which the entity operates recognizes a trade secret as a cognizable property interest.
150
  
Pennsylvania law has long embraced the view that “protection for trade secrets derives in the 
first instance from their status as a species of intellectual property, rather than from the 
relationship between the parties.”151   However, if the chemical formulas of fracking fluids do 
not meet the legal requirements of trade secret status, there is no property right sufficient to 
justify free speech curtailment.  Further, if the chemical formulas were initially true trade secrets, 
the property right in those trade secrets was possibly “extinguished” based on the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Monsanto.  
Information does not qualify for protection under either common law trade secrecy or 
PUTSA unless the information is actually a secret.
152
  The secrecy requirement illustrates the 
rationale underlying trade secret law, which is to provide maximum economic return for 
innovating by preventing others from capturing that return.  As discussed in Part II, Section C, 
Pt. ii, supra, there is at least some question as to whether the chemical composition of fracking 
fluids is legitimately secret.  If that is true, then the medical gag rule cannot be viewed as an 
acceptable incursion on free speech, even if the property-trumps-free speech view is accepted. 
 
PART VI: IMPROVING THE MEDICAL GAG RULE 
There is no doubt that trade secrets need protection.  Ordinary trade secret laws “enable 
businesses to enter into good faith transactions, form stable relationships, and share confidential 
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information, which in turn assists in product development.”153  In other words, protection from 
competitive harms provides an incentive for innovation, and innovation is essential to society.    
However, as much as innovation benefits society, so does free speech.  A balance must therefore 
be struck between the clear need for trade secret protection and the equally essential need for 
dissemination of information.  Where there is no real threat of competitive harm or taking of 
property posed by trade secret disclosure, free speech should not be inhibited.  Because the 
medical gag rule as currently written has the potential to interfere with free speech rights without 
a compelling property right, the law must be changed to avoid unconstitutional incursions on free 
speech. There are two major changes that could eliminate the constitutional infirmities of the 
medical gag rule: requiring trade secret substantiation and tailoring the scope of the 
confidentiality agreement. 
A. Trade Secret Substantiation 
Trade secret substantiation is crucial to determining the legitimacy of restricting disclosure.  
Professor Elizabeth Rowe has come up with a model for striking the balance between trade 
secret protection and public interest.  Trade secret substantiation is the first step in Professor 
Rowe’s “shield-or-disclose” model, because the question of whether the information in question 
meets the status of a trade secret “could be determinative of the entire issue of disclosure because 
if the information is not a trade secret, then that significantly weakens the argument against 
disclosure.”  Trade secret substantiation ensures that competitive harm would actually result to 
the company upon disclosure, which is “in keeping with trade-secret law’s focus on protecting 
against unfair competition.”154  Thus, the medical gag rule should require a company to 
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substantiate its trade secret claim.  This is not a novel proposal for fracking laws—in March, 
2012, Earthjustice, a non-profit environmental law firm, filed a lawsuit against the Wyoming Oil 
and Gas Conservation Commission (“WOGCC”), arguing that regulators are rubber-stamping 
trade secret requests without looking into their merits.  Earthjustice asked the court to “[s]et aside 
WOGCC’s approval of insufficiently supported and overly broad trade secret . . . exemptions.”155  
Some of the states with fracking disclosure laws that exempt trade secrets have included some 
form of substantiation mechanism.  For example, although Colorado “considered and rejected a 
trade secrets regime that would have required the COGCC to review and approve all trade secret 
claims”,156 Colorado’s fracking law “allows an adversely affected individual to notify the 
COGCC [Colorado Oil and Gas Conversation Commission] if they believe that a trade secret 
claim is invalid” and the COGCC will order the company to “substantiate the validity of its 
claim.” 157  If the aggrieved individual disagrees with the COGCC’s determination or the 
COGCC declines to bring any action, that individual could “seek judicial review.”158  In fact, the 
COGCC may choose resolution by the court, “which should have more experience, and better 
procedural tools and protections.”159  Similarly, Texas’s fracking law allows a state agency or a 
landowner on whose property the well is located or adjacent to “challenge a claim of entitlement 
to trade secret protection.”160   
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While limiting trade secret claims by substantiation provides some hope that the states are 
not handing over the reigns to the oil industry, they are still not the most sufficient way to cure 
unsubstantiated trade secret claims. Litigation is an extremely expensive process, so it is unlikely 
that an individual would go through the expense and hardship of challenging an oil company’s 
trade secrecy claim.  Without proper substantiation of trade secret claims, the medical gag rule 
and laws like it restrain speech without any certainty that doing so is at all necessary. The more 
comprehensive approach to trade secret substantiation taken by the federal government provides 
a more promising means of avoiding needless speech incursion. 
The EPA has been proactive in cracking down on trade secret claims.
161
  The EPA’s recent 
regulations under the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”) illustrate the federal 
government’s improved posture towards trade secrets.  Under the TSCA, the EPA makes the 
final determination about whether the information is entitled to confidential treatment.
162
 TSCA 
regulations now provide that any person asserting a claim of confidentiality for a reportable 
chemical substance under the Chemical Data Reporting Rule of the TSCA must substantiate that 
claim, providing “detailed written answers” to questions such as:   
(i) What harmful effects to your competitive position, if any, or to your supplier's 
competitive position, do you think would result from the identity of the chemical 
substance being disclosed in connection with reporting under this part? How 
could a competitor use such information? Would the effects of disclosure be 
substantial? What is the causal relationship between the disclosure and the 
harmful effects? 
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. . .  
(iv)  Has the identity of the chemical substance been kept confidential to the extent 
that your competitors do not know it is being manufactured or imported for a 
commercial purpose by anyone? 
 . . .  
(ix)  If the chemical substance leaves the site in a product that is available to the public 
or your competitors, can the chemical substance be identified by analysis of the 
product?
 163
 
These substantiation questions go straight to the heart of classical trade secret principles, and 
ensure that free speech and public health are not jeopardized by a company’s mere desire to 
avoid bad publicity.   Essentially, these questions embody a sort of mini-adjudication that would 
have taken place if a company were bringing a claim for misappropriation under state or federal 
trade secrecy law.  Pennsylvania should adopt similar substantiation questions for trade secret 
status.  
B. Standard Forms for Confidentiality Agreements  
Substantiating the trade secret claim is only the first step to ensuring that the medical gag rule 
does not unreasonably restrict free speech and endanger public health.  In addition to imposing 
substantiation requirements, the medical gag rule should better define and tailor the terms of the 
confidentiality agreement it endorses.  Colorado’s fracking law requires that the confidentiality 
agreement between a health care provider and an oil company must be exclusively embodied in a 
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standard form provided in the appendix of the statute, known as “Form 35.” 164  However, Form 
35 merely makes explicit what is otherwise presumed in the medical gag rule—it prohibits health 
providers from disclosure for any reason other than the specific health needs asserted.
165
  That 
means that disclosure for research on health issues at large, public debate, or other socially 
valuable purposes is still forbidden.  Professor Rowe’s model would allow for disclosure 
whenever “the health and safety of the public . . . outweigh any competitive harm that the 
proprietor of the trade secret may suffer.”166  This approach is more consistent with the First 
Amendment, because it permits a much wider range of uses for the information disclosed.  To be 
sure, Colorado is on the right track with providing a standard form for its confidentiality 
requirements—however, the scope of confidentiality is more than is needed under ordinary trade 
secret law. 
The standard form confidentiality agreement should prohibit only the type of disclosures and 
conduct that would impair the value of a company’s trade secrets.  For example, Pennsylvania 
would provide in its standard confidentiality agreement form that a health provider is prohibited 
from using the information in any manner that violates PUTSA.   In an attempt to be even more 
specific, the form should incorporate the provisions of PUTSA or at least include them by 
reference.  These provisions would render the medical gag rule constitutional—by only 
prohibiting misconduct instead of protected speech, the law would be narrowly tailored to 
achieve the goal of adequate trade secret protection.  
 The proper balance between trade secret protection and free speech can be reached in 
Pennsylvania’s fracking disclosure law by drawing on the principles underlying ordinary trade 
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secret law. The implementation of a substantiation process and a tailored confidentiality 
agreement will ensure that fracking companies will not be harmed by disclosure of cutting-edge 
technologies that give them a competitive advantage; at the same time, implementing these 
measures will eliminate the danger that free speech, and more importantly public health, will not 
be jeopardized the misguided purpose of protecting large companies from liability. 
C. Qualified Transparency  
Finally, fracking disclosure laws can adopt a system of “qualified transparency” to ensure 
that trade secrets are protected, but not to the extent that jeopardizes public health.   Professor 
Frank Pasquale created the idea of qualified transparency in response to prevalent secrecy in 
cyberspace.  Internet intermediaries employ certain algorithms to “monitor and track what users 
do” and “generate reputations based on that data.”167  Intermediaries also threaten competition by 
skewing the types of advertisements that it allows to appear on any given search, dependent upon 
a deal made with a specific entity.  These practices raise concerns about privacy, discrimination, 
and unfair or deceptive practices in advertising, marketing, and sales.  These concerns are 
heightened in light of the fact that “consumers lack . . . the ability to detect such 
manipulation.”168  However, it is virtually impossible to determine whether a given intermediary 
is engaging in practices that could constitute a violation of privacy or consumer protection law 
because their algorithms are protected trade secrets. Just as trade secrecy in the fracking industry 
is defended as an incentive for innovation, so too is secrecy of internet algorithms: innovation is 
needed for things like search engine algorithms and spam detection.  The solution to this 
dilemma, explains Professor Pasquale, is qualified transparency.  Under qualified transparency of 
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internet intermediaries, a self-regulatory council would be formed, consisting of lawyers, 
“engineers, and programmers who could fully understand the technology affecting data, ranking, 
and traffic management practices.”169  The council would follow up on complaints made by the 
public, and only involve the Federal Trade Commission or Federal Communications 
Commission when.  This approach is preferred over regulation by the Federal Trade Commission 
or the Federal Communications Commission because “only a dedicated group of engineers, 
social scientists, attorneys, and computer scientists are likely to understand particular 
complaints” about the actions of intermediaries, and the risks of disclosure of trade secrets are 
decreased.
170
      
While the idea of qualified transparency was spawned in the context of the internet, it is 
easily applied to the similar dilemma posed by the fracking industry, albeit with some 
nuances.
171
  A council of scientists, doctors, lawyers, and engineers could be assembled.  
Disclosure of practices and formulas would be made to this council instead of the public, but it 
would accomplish many of the goals that public disclosure aspires to achieve.  The council’s 
doctors and scientists could determine the magnitude of harm posed to the public, while the 
engineers, on the other hand, could properly evaluate the genuineness of competitive harm posed 
to fracking companies.  Thus, a more accurate, realistic balance would be struck by the expert 
council than would be by a state agency evaluating trade secret claims, all while maintaining the 
integrity of trade secrets.  Qualified transparency should be combined with trade secret 
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substantiation to determine the precise amount of disclosure and secrecy needed to adequately 
protect the competing interests at stake.   
CONCLUSION 
 While trade secrecy is generally beneficial to innovation and thus to society, the medical 
gag rule uses trade secrecy much to the detriment of society.  Not only does granting fracking 
formulas the dubious status of “trade secret” unjustifiably curtail free and important speech, but 
it endangers the health of citizens.  These harms are so grave that they would be hard to justify 
even if fracking formulas could fairly be characterized as trade secrets.  Stimulating economic 
prosperity and innovation, while certainly important, cannot come at the price of society’s well-
being. In drafting the medical gag rule, the Pennsylvania legislature, and other states with similar 
provisions, has simply not struck the proper balance between trade secret protection and societal 
interests. The changes proposed in this Note reflect a more realistic and disinterested balance and 
will leave neither the fracking companies nor citizens in a worse-off position than they would be 
without the changes.  Of course, fracking companies would likely be exposed to greater tort 
liability, but this can hardly be viewed as a negative effect.  The net effect of eliminating the 
virtually immunity to liability that fracking companies enjoy will be to encourage more 
responsible and cautious operations.  If the legislature declines to make these necessary changes 
on its own—a likely scenario in light of the nepotism to the industry—the First Amendment 
exists as a strong ground upon which the law can be successfully challenged for the reasons 
discussed throughout this Note.    
 
  
